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WILKINSON V DOWNTON AFTER 
RHODES AND ITS FUTURE VIABILITY 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
Pita Roycroft* 
This article analyses the tort in Wilkinson v Downton, commonly referred to as intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, in light of the United Kingdom Supreme Court's decision in Rhodes v OPO. 
After considering the three base elements of the Rhodes Court's newly reformulated tort, and giving 
a brief introduction to the New Zealand equivalent, the article suggests the law in this area is in need 
of further clarification and reform. The Rhodes formulation, while useful, does not go far enough in 
securing a viable future for the tort in light of the developments in negligence and privacy. The article 
justifies the tort's independence and suggests reforms to its elements in this respect. In particular, it 
concludes that the conduct element ought to be based on a "reasonable target" test, and the 
consequence element ought to be modified to allow recovery for damage amounting to severe 
emotional distress outside the range of ordinary human experience.  
I INTRODUCTION 
In 1897, a man told a woman a false tale that her husband had been horribly bashed up at the 
races.1 She suffered from severe distress, nausea and her hair turned white. In 1922, a man approached 
a house at night and threatened the occupier that he would burn him out.2 The occupier's wife suffered 
a violent nervous shock and a miscarriage. In 1993, an extreme zombie splatter film featured a family 
burial plot in the background.3 A family member was shocked and deeply disturbed. Most recently, 
in 2015, a father wrote a book about himself, describing the horrors of his past, and dedicated it to his 
son. It was alleged the son would suffer from psychiatric illness if he read the book.4 The victims in 
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all four scenarios brought proceedings to recover for, or prevent, emotional harm.5 Should they have 
been successful in doing so? The tort governing this area has been conceptually uncertain since 1897, 
but that changed in 2015.  
This article analyses the Wilkinson v Downton tort, occasionally referred to as intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (IIED).6 In light of the United Kingdom Supreme Court's decision in 
Rhodes v OPO,7 the primary focus is an evaluation of the tort's future viability in New Zealand. The 
article compares the approaches of cognate jurisdictions and proposes that, while Rhodes represents 
the best formulation so far, further reforms should be adopted if the tort is to be a useful cause of 
action, independent of the torts of negligence and privacy. For example, recovery should be allowed 
for severe emotional distress not amounting to a recognisable psychiatric illness.8 Issues concerning 
IIED's impact on freedom of expression, or the relevance of statutory causes of action under the 
accident compensation scheme,9 or harassment legislation (such as the Harmful Digital 
Communications Act 2015), fall outside the scope of the article. 
II WILKINSON v DOWNTON 
Wilkinson was the unfortunate victim of a misconceived practical joke played on her by Downton. 
Believing it would be harmless banter, Downton announced at the Albion public house that 
Wilkinson's husband had broken both his legs in an accident and she was to "go at once with a cab 
and some pillows to fetch him home".10 The statement was false. Wilkinson, believing it to be true, 
suffered severe shock causing her weeks of physical and mental suffering.  
Wright J was faced with a choice: deny Wilkinson recovery for lack of a cause of action, or fashion 
a new intentional tort based on indirectly inflicted physical and emotional suffering. Fortunately for 
Wilkinson, Wright J formulated a new tort, identifying the claimant's protected interest as her "legal 
right to personal safety".11 The tort required a defendant to have "wilfully done an act calculated to 
cause physical harm" which in fact "caused physical harm".12 Even if there was no subjective 
  
5  In Rhodes the proceedings were brought on the victim's behalf.  
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intention to cause harm, intention could be imputed as a matter of law if the consequences were so 
likely a result of the defendant's conduct that it could not reasonably be said that they were not 
intended.13 Wright J then held that the result was not too remote, on the basis that "the connection 
between the cause and the effect [was] sufficiently close and complete".14 
Wright J's language, and in particular the odd mix of legal elements which would today be 
regarded as an illegitimate merging of intentional and negligence-based torts,15 gave rise to decades 
of confusion as to what the tort actually was. Some suggested it was a precursor to modern 
negligence;16 others thought it was an intentional tort but its indirect nature meant it was 
distinguishable from the traditional torts of trespass to the person and therefore could legitimately mix 
elements from both.17 In 2015, the United Kingdom Supreme Court quelled much of the confusion in 
Rhodes.  
III RHODES v OPO 
Lord Hoffmann's judgment in Wainwright v Home Office heralded the potential demise of the 
Wilkinson action.18 He reasoned the tort had "no leading role in the modern law" given its inability to 
compensate for mere distress and the growth of the tort of negligence.19 However, Lord Hoffmann's 
judgment was wrong in this respect, and no more than an "interesting reconstruction [that showed] 
the pitfalls of interpreting a decision … without a full understanding of jurisprudence and common 
legal terminology of the earlier period".20  
A The Facts 
The claimant in Rhodes, a 12-year old boy known only as OPO, had proceedings brought on his 
behalf by his mother and godfather seeking to restrain publication of a book by the claimant's father, 
James Rhodes. The book, entitled Instrumental, is a vivid account of the abuse suffered by Rhodes 
  
13  At 59. 
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17  See Bradley, above n 3. See also Carrier v Bonham [2001] QCA 234, [2002] 1 Qd R 474 at [26] per 
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when he was young. Instrumental was dedicated in part to OPO. It was alleged that publication would 
constitute IIED (referred to in Rhodes as intentionally causing physical or psychological harm).21  
At first instance, the application for an interim injunction against publication pending trial was 
struck out.22 Bean J held there was no duty of care for an action in negligence and that Wilkinson did 
not extend beyond false or threatening words.23 There was also no action for misuse of private 
information.24 The Court of Appeal, reversing the High Court decision in part, found for OPO and 
issued an interim injunction restraining certain parts of the book from being published.25 Arden LJ, 
giving the leading judgment, held Wilkinson was not limited to false or intimidating acts or 
statements,26 but they must be unjustified.27 She held that publication of certain passages in the book 
and its dedication to the claimant was unjustified, and that the necessary intent could be imputed to 
the defendant.28 
Rhodes appealed to the Supreme Court. The question before that Court concerned the proper scope 
of Wilkinson in modern law, and whether it could ever be used to prevent a person from publishing 
true information about themselves.29 The Court held for the appellant on the basis that two of the three 
major elements of the reformulated tort had not been made out.30  
B The Rhodes Elements 
The Rhodes Court affirmed the existence of the tort, clarified its purpose and reformulated its 
elements. The first joint reasons, given by Lady Hale and Lord Toulson,31 differed slightly from the 
second joint reasons given by Lord Neuberger.32 The Court agreed on three basic elements: conduct, 
mental and consequence.  
  
21  At [1].  
22  OPO v MLA [2014] EWHC 2468 (QB) [OPO (HC)] at [38].  
23  At [27]–[32].  
24  At [23].  
25  OPO v MLA [2014] EWCA Civ 1277, [2014] HRLR 31 [OPO (CA)] at [115].  
26  At [65]–[66].  
27  At [68].  
28  At [77].  
29  Rhodes, above n 4, at [1].  
30  At [91].  
31  At [1]–[90] with whom Lord Clarke and Lord Wilson agreed.  
32  At [91]–[122] with whom Lord Wilson also agreed.   
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1 Conduct element 
The Court held the first element requires "words or conduct directed at the claimant for which 
there is no justification or excuse".33 Interestingly, there is little discussion of what "directed at the 
claimant" actually means. Presumably, it is an attempt to narrow the scope of the tort to the very 
person or persons to whom the defendant attempted to inflict distress upon. The claimant may be part 
of a group (for example, where a person shouts "fire" in a cinema, when there is no fire, the address 
is to the audience, and any member might possibly be a claimant).34 Furthermore, not all actions that 
satisfy these requirements will necessarily be actionable; the first joint reasons stated it was unlikely 
that conduct that was not "deceptive, threatening or possibly abusive" would qualify.35 As discussed 
below, this requirement needs further clarification.  
2 Mental element 
The Court held that the requisite mental element was intention to cause "at least severe mental or 
emotional distress",36 a significantly lower threshold than intention to cause physical injury or a 
recognisable psychiatric illness. The first joint reasons also abolished the doctrine of imputed intent: 
that a defendant could be held liable for the natural and probable consequences of actions at law, while 
not subjectively intending them in fact.37 A court is now required to infer, as a matter of fact, whether 
the defendant actually intends to cause severe distress. Recklessness was deemed insufficient, chiefly 
because it would be problematic in practice and unduly widen the field of liability.38 
Interestingly, Lord Neuberger noted that the intention requirement might "at first sight" seem too 
narrow, not least because it "might appear that it would not have caught the defendant in Wilkinson" 
as he merely intended a joke.39 However, he explained that the fact the statement was a joke is not 
necessarily inconsistent with an intention to upset. How, Lord Neuberger asked, could Downton not 
have intended to cause Wilkinson significant distress by falsely telling her that her husband had been 
seriously injured, given it was the purpose of the joke?40 With respect, this reasoning reverts back to 
a standard of imputed intention, because it is based on the consequences being "so obvious that the 
  
33  At [88]. 
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40  At [112]. 
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perpetrator cannot realistically say that those consequences were unintended".41 So the issue of 
exactly how a Court is to infer intention as a matter of fact, without using probability or other notions 
incidental to imputing intention as a matter of law, is, problematically, left open in Rhodes.  
3 Consequence element 
The first joint reasons in Rhodes held that the consequence element required damage amounting 
to physical injury or a recognisable psychiatric illness.42 This conclusion was reached without a full 
discussion of why it was appropriate. Conversely, the second joint reasons held that, if an intention to 
cause severe distress is enough to establish the tort in principle, it was difficult to see why something 
more serious must be suffered before compensation can be recovered.43 Lord Neuberger also reasoned 
that the narrow restrictions on the tort's other elements provided a basis for holding severe distress 
should be the relevant damage threshold.  
4 Justifications 
The Supreme Court canvassed various justifications for conduct which might amount to IIED. 
These included the freedom to report the truth (with obvious exceptions, including where there is a 
duty to keep the information private),44 the public interest in disclosing information about one's 
history for others to learn,45 and where the law expressly gives positive authorisation.  
IV COMPARING THE NEW ZEALAND APPROACH 
A Case Law 
New Zealand first adopted Wilkinson in Stevenson v Basham.46 Stevenson went to the Bashams' 
house and demanded that Mr Basham give up possession, lest he "burn him out".47 Mrs Basham, 
though not in the presence of Stevenson, was inside the house and heard his threats, causing her severe 
distress and a miscarriage. Herdman J held that "physical injury which is the consequence of a shock 
deliberately caused by a statement made by the defendant" is actionable, provided it was the "natural 
and direct consequence" of the shock.48  
  
41  At [112]. 
42  At [73] and [88].  
43  At [119].  
44  At [77].  
45  At [75]–[77]. 
46  Stevenson, above n 2. 
47  At 227.  
48  At 229.  
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In Tucker v News Media Ownership (Tucker I), the claimant successfully relied on IIED as a novel 
basis for an interim injunction against publication of certain facts about his criminal history.49 This 
was upheld in the Court of Appeal, but that Court suggested the cause of action arose where "one who 
by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to 
another is liable for such emotional distress, provided that bodily harm results from it".50 At the 
substantive hearing, McGechan J refused to continue the injunction on the facts, but accepted IIED 
was part of New Zealand law.51  
In Bradley v Wingnut Films, Wingnut had produced a zombie "splatter" film featuring substantial 
amounts of blood and gore in a cemetery.52 Bradley's family burial plot appeared in the background 
for 14 seconds and was only directly involved at one point where an actor sat on the steps leading to 
the plot. Bradley brought proceedings under a number of grounds, including IIED. Gallen J held that 
IIED required a defendant to have "wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the 
plaintiff" and that the shock and illness were "natural consequences of the wrongful act".53 Something 
"more than a transient reaction" of emotional distress was required, however initially severe, and that 
reaction needed to translate into "something physical … having a duration which [was] more than 
merely transient".54 Intention could be imputed, and the foreseeability of the consequences was also 
relevant.55 Gallen J held for the defendant on the basis the actions were not intended, were not directed 
against the claimant and the consequences were not foreseeable.  
B A Brief Comparison 
Since Bradley, IIED has not developed any further in New Zealand but has been mentioned in a 
few cases, the most recent being from 2013.56 The current formulation of the New Zealand tort is 
inconsistent with that of Rhodes in several respects. First, intention must be to cause physical harm or 
psychiatric illness, rather than severe distress. Secondly, intention may be imputed to the defendant 
based on the foreseeability of the consequences. Thirdly, in deciding whether the conduct was directed 
  
49  Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd HC Wellington CP477/86, 22 October 1986 [Tucker I] at 2.  
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RS Chambers Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (18th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1981) at 198–
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53  At 422.  
54  At 421.  
55  At 422. 
56  See H v B HC Wellington CP7/97, 4 September 1998; L v G (2002) 6 HRNZ 489 (DC); and Deliu v Hong 
[2013] NZHC 735. 
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at the claimant, the defendant's intention is determinative. Fourthly, the discussion of foreseeability, 
and whether the consequences were natural, implies a question of remoteness. Finally, the 
consequence must be physical harm or a recognisable psychiatric illness (though this aspect is only 
inconsistent with the second joint reasons). 
V REFORMING THE ELEMENTS 
Rhodes breathed new life into IIED, but the Court did not go far enough in reformulating its 
elements to ensure a viable future for the tort. This part of the article argues for further expansion of 
the elements outlined in Rhodes, without which, as explained later, the tort has little real future. A 
comparative evaluation between Rhodes and Bradley is provided. The author submits that, while some 
aspects of the New Zealand tort should be modified in line with the United Kingdom approach, the 
Rhodes version of the tort itself is also in need of reconsideration.  
A Conduct Element 
1 Issues 
The lack of definition as to what "directed at the claimant" means within the conduct element is 
problematic.57 Both Rhodes and Bradley require the defendant's conduct, whether actions or 
statements, to be directed at the claimant, but they approach this question differently.58 Rhodes treats 
the question as one of fact, whereas Bradley and Stevenson treat it as a matter of law. The major 
difference between the United Kingdom and New Zealand approaches is that fewer claimants will be 
able to prove that the conduct was directed at them under the former approach than under the latter. 
For example, in Stevenson, the claimant, "although not actually present", heard the defendant's 
threat to burn down the house and thereby suffered a "violent nervous shock" causing a miscarriage.59 
It was found Stevenson knew Mrs Basham was inside the house, but it is doubtful whether she would 
succeed under the Rhodes formulation.  
It is arguable that Stevenson addressed himself, or at least "should have known" he was addressing 
himself, to "any person who at the time might be an inmate of the house".60 Indeed, the first joint 
reasons in Rhodes stipulated the claimant may be part of a group whom the defendant addressed.61 
However, as Herdman J held that the conduct was directed at Mrs Basham, Stevenson is arguably 
inconsistent with the findings in Rhodes because the book, though dedicated to OPO, was considered 
  
57  Rhodes, above n 4, at [88].  
58  At [74] and [88]; and Bradley, above n 3, at 422.  
59  Stevenson, above n 2, at 228.  
60  At 228. 
61  Rhodes, above n 4, at [74]. 
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not to be directed at him.62 Furthermore, Herdman J wrongly mixed intention with direction in the 
sense that he held Stevenson's threats to be directed at Mrs Basham on the basis that Stevenson either 
knew or ought to have known (via imputed intention) that she was likely to suffer distress and injury.63 
That direction is synonymous with intention was affirmed in Bradley. 
2 Reform 
Unfortunately, this leaves the law with two possible standards as to when conduct will be directed 
at the claimant. Stevenson and Bradley used imputed intention to find direction, meaning it is a 
question of law. Furthermore, even if those Courts found the defendant had the relevant subjective 
intention, it was determinative of the direction question. Conversely, Rhodes severs the conduct 
element from the mental element entirely, leaving direction as a question of fact. It is even possible 
to either distinguish or overrule Stevenson and Bradley in light of Rhodes, given the latter case 
abolished the doctrine of imputed intention.64  
However, if direction is a matter of fact rather than a question of law, what does this mean and 
how will a claimant establish it? A broad contextual approach is probably the best. The test for 
direction should be whether the reasonable person in the position of the claimant would reasonably 
have believed that they were the target of the words or conduct in question. Relevant factors to take 
into account could include whether the claimant subjectively believed they were the addressee, 
whether the defendant's conduct was premeditated and whether the claimant was in the defendant's 
presence, actually or constructively, at the relevant time. Other policy-based considerations, such as 
the forum in which a statement is made, and whether the claimant was particularly vulnerable,65 might 
also be relevant. No factor should be determinative as a matter of law; Stevenson and Bradley should 
be overruled in this respect. This test is similar to the identification test for defamation in the sense it 
need be of and concerning the claimant. The claimant must prove that they were the target personally, 
or were referred to equally as part of a sufficiently delineated class or group.66 So, where it is alleged 
that conduct towards a group is to be understood as referring to every member of it,67 direction should 
be a question of fact and degree for the court. 
This test is sufficiently restrictive to prevent overly-sensitive people, to whom the words or actions 
were clearly not addressed, from bringing claims. If a defendant were to post publicly on social media 
  
62  At [74].  
63  Stevenson, above n 2, at 228.  
64  Rhodes, above n 4, at [81]–[82].  
65  See the first joint reasons' discussion of the egg-shell skull principle in Rhodes, above n 4, at [87]. 
66  See Ursula Cheer "Defamation" in Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (7th ed, Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2016) 839 at 866.  
67  See for example Hyams v Peterson [1991] 3 NZLR 648 (CA) at 654–655 per Cooke P.  
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that "all men are rapists", no person who saw that post would satisfy the direction requirement. While 
the claimant might be an involuntary addressee, a reasonable person would likely infer that they were 
not the target, or that the statement had no specific target. Importantly, the reasonable target test would 
likely produce the same conclusions on the direction questions in Stevenson and Bradley. The conduct 
element in Rhodes would also remain unchanged; OPO would not satisfy the reasonable target test: 
the book cannot have been directed at him.  
B Mental Element 
1 Imputed intention 
The requisite fault standard in Rhodes is subjective intention to, at least, cause severe distress. 
Intention may be inferred from the facts, but cannot be imputed by law on the basis the outcome was 
a "natural and probable" consequence of the defendant's actions.68 Rhodes and Bradley are consistent 
in requiring intention as the fault standard, but the latter case held intention could be imputed and 
foreseeability was therefore important in that context.69 There are several reasons why imputed 
intention is not appropriate.  
First, imputed intention wrongfully mixes two separate tort elements: a fault standard and 
remoteness.70 Using a remoteness test to justify finding a mental fault standard (such as intention), 
and then using that very finding to satisfy an element of remoteness at a later stage, leaves any 
consideration of either element devoid of any separate or logical meaning.71 So, regardless of whether 
the test for remoteness is reasonable foreseeability or naturalness and probability,72 if intention under 
the Wilkinson tort is imputed on the basis the consequences were foreseeable but remoteness is 
assessed later to consider whether the kind of harm inflicted ought to be recoverable, in what 
circumstances will it ever be in principle correct to conclude those consequences were too remote or 
not caused in law by the defendant? These elements ought to be kept separate; intention in relation to 
IIED ought only to be subjective intention inferred from all the facts. The Rhodes Court abolished the 
doctrine of imputed intention without discussing its conceptual difficulties, describing it as a "vestige 
of a previous age".73 
  
68  Rhodes, above n 4, at [45] and [81]. 
69  Bradley, above n 3, at 422.  
70  See Lunney, above n 15, at 183.  
71  See Christopher Slade "Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: Reconsidering the Test for Liability" (2008) 
34 Advoc Q 322 at 341. But see Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union [1984] 3 WWR 296 (BCSC) at [51]. 
72  See Rhodes, above n 4, at [45] and Wilkinson, above n 1, at 59–60. See also Bill Atkin "Trespassing on Land" 
in Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (7th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2016) 481 at 511–512, 
n 273. 
73  Rhodes, above n 4, at [81]. 
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Secondly, if the consequence element is to be reformed to allow recovery for severe distress 
falling short of a recognisable psychiatric illness,74 imputed intention "will not do".75 People regularly 
engage in conduct which is capable of distressing, humiliating or embarrassing without a subjective 
intention to cause severe distress. If intention could be imputed, a defendant might wrongly be held 
to have intended severe distress as a result of the probability of the actions causing it, when the only 
actual intention was to upset or to anger. The tort should not be invoked to allow recovery from a 
heated argument or harmless banter.76 Bradley ought to be overruled on the basis it allows imputed 
intention.  
2 Recklessness? 
The United States equivalent of Wilkinson imposes liability even where the defendant is 
reckless.77 Rhodes specifically rules out recklessness as a qualifying fault standard for the mental 
element.78 The first joint reasons held it would be problematic in practice because of the issues with 
the scope of liability for defendants. For example, a defendant in a heated dispute with a neighbour 
might make a deliberately insulting remark, intending it to be upsetting but not to cause severe 
distress.79 So, a recklessness standard might impose liability for disagreements part of ordinary life 
where society would not otherwise deem the defendant morally culpable. Therefore, Rhodes has a 
higher fault standard, but its United States counterpart has a higher threshold for the conduct element 
by requiring it to be "extreme or outrageous".80 Departing from the United States fault standard might 
be considered a quid pro quo for lack of this conduct requirement. 
C Consequence Element 
The problem with courts treating Wilkinson as an action on the case, akin to an early form of 
negligence, has led judges to continue to require that the damage be physical harm or a recognisable 
psychiatric illness before compensation will flow, as is the case with negligently inflicted nervous 
shock.81 IIED should cover consequences of severe emotional distress. The Rhodes Court went "too 
  
74  See Part V(C). 
75  Wainwright, above n 16, at [45].  
76  See Rhodes, above n 4, at [86] and [111].  
77  American Law Institute Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (American 
Law Institute, Philadelphia, 2012) at § 46. See also R Fraker "Reformulating Outrage: a critical analysis of 
the problematic tort of IIED" (2008) 61 V and L Rev 983. 
78  Rhodes, above n 4, at [87].  
79  At [86].  
80  American Law Institute, above n 77, at § 46.  
81  van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit [2000] 1 NZLR 179 (CA). See also, in relation to IIED, 
Rhodes, above n 4, at [88] per Lady Hale and Lord Toulson; and Bradley, above n 3, at 421.  
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far in narrowing the tort's scope" by requiring physical harm or a recognisable psychiatric illness.82 
This requirement is "anachronistic" and sets the bar too high.83  
1 A coherent test 
The "trick for the law" is distinguishing between claims that warrant compensation, and those that 
do not, and articulating a "coherent basis upon which such a distinction can be made".84 For IIED, the 
distinction should be a question of severity, and the coherent basis should be whether the severe 
distress falls "plainly outside the range of ordinary human experience".85 The courts have the capacity 
to answer this question and to distinguish between "severe" and "mere" distress.86 It is a composite 
test. The following six reasons justify adopting this test and lowering the consequence threshold.  
2 New Zealand authority 
Though Bradley requires a claimant to establish something "more than a transient reaction, 
however initially severe" which must then "translate itself into something physical",87 the suggestion 
that a lesser harm will suffice for recovery is not without precedent. Thomas J in his dissenting 
judgment in van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit held that a claimant should be able to 
recover in negligence for mental suffering which is not a recognisable psychiatric illness but is 
"plainly outside the range of ordinary human experience".88  
While van Soest was a negligence case, Thomas J's arguments for a lower threshold are more 
compelling for IIED, given a claim in negligence is usually capped at what is reasonably foreseeable 
on the basis that the defendant's conduct was unwitting or careless. An intentional tort knows no such 
reasonable foreseeability cap.89 First, Thomas J suggests such a restriction is simply an "arbitrary" 
limitation measure that "can exclude some deserving complainants who suffered something which, 
while short of medically proven psychiatric harm, was considerably more serious and impacting than 
  
82  Chris DL Hunt "Wilkinson v Downton Revisited" (2015) 74 CLJ 392 at 395.  
83  Giller v Procopets [2008] VSCA 236, (2008) 24 VR 1 at [31] per Maxwell P. Contrast Slade, above n 71, at 
328. 
84  Anthony Gray "Wilkinson v Downton: New work for an old tort to do?" (2015) 23 Tort L Rev 127 at 140.  
85  van Soest, above n 81, at [107].  
86  See Thomas J's dissenting judgment in van Soest, above n 81.  
87  Bradley, above n 3, at 421.  
88  van Soest, above n 81, at [107]. 
89  See Wilson v Pringle [1987] 1 QB 237 (CA) at 31; and Mayfair v Pears [1987] 1 NZLR 459 (CA). See also 
Stephen Todd "Trespass to the Person" in Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (7th ed, Thomson 
Reuters, Wellington, 2016) 101 at 105.  
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commonplace grief or sorrow".90 The reasoning suggests that occasions arise where society would 
deem it sufficiently morally blameworthy to impose liability without psychiatric proof of mental 
illness.  
Secondly, Thomas J reasoned that the law is capable of assessing mental distress.91 For example, 
breach of contract may lead to damages for "disappointment, the distress, the upset and frustration 
caused by the breach".92 The courts are also "prepared to award damages for mental distress in claims 
based in tort where the distress is consequent upon the commission of some other wrong".93 This 
reasoning is highly relevant to IIED because the conduct of the defendant will nearly always be 
"wrong" in another sense: "deceptive, threatening, or possibly abusive".94 Requiring a double-fault 
standard provides added justification for allowing recovery for severe distress.  
3 Other jurisdictions' authorities 
Recovery for severe distress where the defendant intended this result has been hinted at in the 
United Kingdom. In Hunter v Canary Wharf, Lord Hoffmann saw "no reason why a tort of intention 
should be subject to the rule which excludes compensation for mere distress, inconvenience or 
discomfort in actions based on negligence".95 In Wainwright, he reserved his position but did not 
resile from that basic proposition given the "policy considerations" which made intentional torts 
different from negligence. In Rhodes, Lord Neuberger held that there was a "powerful case"—where 
intention to cause distress is an "essential ingredient"—that it should alone be enough for the claimant 
to show significant distress.96 He reasoned that, "if an intention to cause the claimant significant 
distress is an ingredient of the tort and is enough to establish the tort in principle", it was difficult to 
see why something more than severe distress must be proved before the claimant could recover.97  
Most United States' jurisdictions allow compensation for severe distress falling short of a 
recognisable psychiatric illness.98 "Severe emotional harm" is recoverable, and fears of indeterminate 
  
90  van Soest, above n 81, at [101] per Thomas J.  
91  Compare the majority judgment in van Soest, above n 81.  
92  See for example Jarvis v Swan Tours [1973] 1 QB 233 (CA). 
93  van Soest, above n 81, at [104] per Thomas J.   
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95  Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655 (HL) at 707.  
96  Rhodes, above n 4, at [119].  
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98  American Law Institute, above n 77, at § 46. See also Fraker, above n 77.  
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liability have failed to materialise.99 The retention of the qualifier "severe" means a moment of 
fleeting distress is unlikely to qualify.100 There is also some suggestion in Australian authorities that, 
while recovery for mental suffering in negligence requires proof of a recognisable psychiatric illness, 
something "less than this will suffice in order to successfully bring a claim for [IIED]".101 
4 A filter 
The United States imposes an extra burden on claimants to prove the defendant's conduct was 
"extreme" or "outrageous".102 This requirement has a dual function. First, it acts as a liability filter, 
narrowing circumstances in which the defendant's actions can be tortious. Secondly, it represents a 
policy decision in the law that, to recover damages for severe distress falling short of a recognisable 
psychiatric illness, a defendant's actions must be doubly wrong in "some looser sense" rather just 
intending a particular type of harm.103  
While acknowledging any filter based on a loose sense of moral wrong may be somewhat 
subjective, the Rhodes Court formulated a legal filter for the English tort, conceding that subjective 
assessments "cannot be avoided".104 The first joint reasons explained it was "difficult to envisage any 
circumstances" in which the defendant's actions were not "deceptive, threatening or possibly abusive" 
that could give rise to liability.105 The Court also required the conduct to be "without justification or 
reasonable excuse",106 or at least "gratuitous".107  
However, the filter's subjectivity and its lack of definition are problematic. If a broad interpretation 
is given, one might question whether it would exclude many cases at all, not least because Rhodes left 
open whether actions that were not deceptive or threatening, but were abusive, could give rise to 
  
99  Geoffrey Christopher Rapp "Defense against Outrage and the Perils of Parasitic Torts" (2010) 45 Ga L Rev 
107 at 136.  
100  Gray, above n 84, at 141. 
101  At 129, referring to Maxwell P in Giller, above n 83. 
102  See American Law Institute, above n 77, at § 46. 
103  Denise Réaume "The Role of Intention in the Tort in Wilkinson v Downton" in Jason W Neyers, Erika 
Chamberlain and Stephen GA Pitel (eds) Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2007) 533 
at 551.  
104  Rhodes, above n 4, at [110]. 
105  At [77]. 
106  At [74]. 
107  At [106].  
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liability.108 Lord Neuberger reasoned that neither description was ideal given "virtually every threat, 
untruth or insult can be said to be unjustified, inexcusable and gratuitous".109  
One further issue concerns situations where the information is true but nevertheless sufficiently 
threatening or abusive. For example, if a stepfather were to reveal to an adopted stepson: "Your real 
father is a murderer; I am going to tell everyone and I hope you feel humiliated". Assuming the 
statement is true, its threatening and abusive nature might give rise to liability under Rhodes. In 
situations like this, the claimant could also have difficulties establishing liability under other torts: 
invasion of privacy requires the information to be about the claimant, and a defence to defamation is 
that the information is true. Thus, the filter is not too restrictive as to deny a remedy for deserving 
claimants.  
There are several reasons why the filter is a principled addition despite its perceived problems.110 
First, it is justified if its underlying function is to restrict situations where claimants can recover for 
mental suffering falling short of a recognisable psychiatric illness. If, however, its underlying function 
were to justify the tort as a whole, it might be more problematic. Those reasons are canvassed in 
Rhodes in relation to IIED's potential impact on freedom of expression.111 Secondly, an element of 
subjectivity may be desirable as it will allow the courts to exclude frivolous or vexatious claims, and 
let the law "develop in a characteristic common law way … on a case by case basis".112 Overall, while 
the liability filter might be a "challenging task",113 this is not a sufficient basis to deny its existence 
as an extra hurdle for a claimant in order to recover for severe distress.  
5 Other intentional torts 
Compensation for severe distress, and even lesser injury to feelings or dignity, are not unknown 
to the other intentional torts of trespass to the person: battery, assault and false imprisonment.114 They 
are not restricted to physical harm or psychiatric illness in the same way negligence is; they are wide 
enough to encompass conduct which "merely injures the dignity" of the claimant.115 For example, 
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battery is actionable per se and so any unlawful contact qualifies,116 making it clear the tort covers 
"offensive as well as harmful" contacts.117 Assault is exclusively concerned with causing mental 
anguish – its essence being the reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery, without the need for 
a battery.118 False imprisonment covers "purely dignitary injuries",119 given there is no minimum 
duration of imprisonment and damages may therefore be recovered for even token confinement.120 
Indeed, many traditional cases might have fallen within the Wilkinson principle.121 It has been 
suggested that Wilkinson is a category of residual liability, created to fill the gap between the classic 
intentional torts and the unintentional torts.122 So, it is principled to suggest IIED can sit somewhere 
in between being actionable per se and requiring a recognisable psychiatric illness. That "somewhere" 
should be severe distress. Finally, while Deliu v Hong states Wilkinson is distinct from trespass to the 
person,123 this is only correct in so far that it does not neatly fit into that category. The tort's intentional 
nature provides sufficient similarity to trespass to the person that recovery for severe distress is 
justified.  
6 Intentional conduct 
Interestingly, while the first joint reasons noted that there were "good reasons of social policy" for 
the law to treat a person who intentionally caused damage to another more harshly than one who 
carelessly did so, it was still concluded that recovery cannot extend to distress not amounting to a 
recognisable psychiatric illness.124 Though this observation was made in the context of justifying 
IIED's independence from negligence, it is difficult to see why it could not equally apply to allowing 
recovery for severe distress. The level of moral culpability is higher when a defendant subjectively 
intends the consequence to result, compared to merely negligent conduct. This is also reflected by the 
intentional torts allowing recovery for all "direct" consequences of the defendant's acts,125 rather than 
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damage of the kind that was only "reasonably foreseeable".126 It is socially undesirable for a claimant 
who suffers severe distress outside the range of ordinary human experience – as a result of an 
intentional action by the defendant to cause that damage – to be without a remedy when that was the 
very purpose of the defendant's actions. Why should anyone be without legal recourse for behaviour 
that causes them significant mental anguish? The substitution of imputed intention by subjective 
intention also means that the defendant actually has a malicious motive to cause harm, and is therefore 
more morally answerable for the consequences than where the law imputes the necessary intent. 
7 Availability of injunctions 
In Rhodes, OPO was unsuccessful in gaining an interim injunction restraining publication of 
Instrumental.127 Had he been successful, the order sought would have had the aim of preventing 
psychiatric illness. It is likely that, in similar cases involving potential publication of information or 
threatening conduct, claimants will seek a similar remedy. However, if the consequence element 
requires physical harm or a recognisable psychiatric illness, claimants would have a difficult legal 
hurdle to clear, one that may be too burdensome. As the relevant threshold for a quia timet injunction 
is "a strong probability of grave damage",128 claimants would need to produce compelling evidence 
that a particular psychiatric illness will be suffered.129 Despite the availability of expert medical 
evidence, it is difficult to predict with this level of certainty that such a consequence will result. If 
severe distress were the necessary harm, the prospects of success would be better. Vulnerable 
claimants, such as children or the mentally disabled, should not be denied quia timet relief and suffer 
harm waiting for a regular prohibitive injunction to stop the defendant's conduct after the onset of 
psychiatric illness. 
D Summary 
Overall, the Rhodes elements provide a good basis for the tort's continued survival, but they do 
not go far enough. The proposed reforms – particularly the clarification of the conduct element and 
the lowering of the consequence threshold – offer a more secure alternative to the Rhodes formulation. 
However, IIED's future rests on more than just its internal structure. Its relationship with other torts, 
especially negligence and privacy, and how it fits into the wider tort landscape are also important.  
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VI SUBSUMPTION INTO NEGLIGENCE? 
Wilkinson's place in tort law has been characterised by a long-standing debate as to whether it 
should be subsumed into negligence.130 However, there are conceptual and policy-based flaws in the 
subsumption argument. The article provides five reasons that justify IIED's independent existence and 
argues that negligence will not do "just as well".131 
A Lack of Precedent 
First, there is no actual authority for holding the fault standard in Wilkinson was negligence. As 
the name suggests, IIED is an intentional tort.132 Intention in the Wilkinson context means intention 
to bring about some harmful or wrongful consequence, rather than a mere deliberate act or 
statement.133 Wright J held the defendant's actions had to be "wilful" while also distinguishing 
Victorian Railways v Coultas,134 a Privy Council case on negligently inflicted nervous shock that, 
though involving a deliberate act, did not involve "any element of wilful wrong".135 If Coultas was 
distinguished on the basis of wilfulness, there must be more to wilfulness than a deliberate act, as the 
defendant in Coultas acted deliberately but negligently.136  
Further, it is implausible to suggest Wright J used wilfulness or intention as "code for negligence" 
simply by looking to the facts.137 Réaume questions whether there is a "substantial risk" that telling 
someone her husband has been "bashed up" will result in physical harm resulting from shock.138 It is 
possible, but not likely. Indeed, if the outcome was reasonably foreseeable to Downton (and intent 
was not imputed), why would later cases after the dawn of modern negligence continue to use this 
language?139 In New Zealand, Bradley specifically states "that the tort depends upon the actions 
concerned being intentional", holding that "no doubt that distinguishes it from … negligence".140 So, 
on the basis of the reasoning in Wilkinson itself, there was a clear distinction made between a 
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deliberate but careless act which brought about an unreasonable risk of harm (negligence) and an 
intentional act done with the specific purpose of committing some harm or other wrong (Wilkinson). 
B Remoteness 
An intention to cause harm imports a higher level of moral culpability than merely inadvertent 
conduct. Tort law responds to this distinction by imposing a threshold for the amount of damages the 
defendant will be liable for, dependent on the type of tort and the defendant's state of mind. This is 
known as remoteness. The underlying question is: to what extent should the defendant be liable for 
the consequences of the tortious actions? In the case of intentional torts and, it is submitted, IIED, the 
relevant remoteness standard is one of directness or "all natural and probable consequences" of the 
defendant's conduct.141 In negligence, the defendant will only be liable for consequences that were of 
a kind that was reasonably foreseeable.142 Subsuming IIED into negligence would mean that a 
defendant would be liable only for consequences up to this threshold, which is undesirable if the 
defendant actually intended the harm to occur. The first joint reasons specifically held that there were 
"good reasons of social policy" for the law to treat a person who deliberately does something which 
causes another harm by telling them a false story more harshly than one who carelessly passes on 
false information.143  
There may be situations where the consequences of the defendant's acts could be said to be direct 
but not reasonably foreseeable; so if IIED were to be subsumed into negligence, deserving claimants 
might go uncompensated. Réaume notes a negligence analysis, in cases where "serious mental health 
problems triggered by the defendant's abusive behaviour" linger for years, will "require courts to 
decide how much of this was actually foreseeable".144 "Undoubtedly", some previously successful 
claimants would "fall afoul of a foreseeability requirement".145 For example, if Wilkinson were to be 
so shocked by Downton's joke that she collapsed and entered into a coma, can it be said that this kind 
of consequence was reasonably foreseeable? Probably not. What can be said, however, is that it was 
a "direct" result of Downton's statement. Indeed, while Rhodes held that, in relation to IIED, a "loose 
analogy may be drawn with the 'egg shell skull' doctrine",146 it has long been appreciated that that 
doctrine "fits uneasily within the negligence principle".147 
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C Remedies 
Rhodes, Bradley and Tucker I all involved applications for an injunction, relying on the Wilkinson 
action. None of these cases questioned the availability of injunctive relief under IIED. If, however, 
IIED were to be subsumed into negligence, claimants would not be able to seek an injunction to 
prevent harmful conduct outside the tort(s) of privacy. Claimants should be able to seek an injunction 
to prevent severe distress. The Rhodes Court did not deny the injunction for want of jurisdiction to 
grant one. Rather, the tort was simply not made out.148 In an appropriate case, an injunction may be 
granted. For example, in the recent "Wicked Campers" campaign, offensive slogans and cartoons 
encouraging drug use and sexual violence were painted on the sides of vans for recreational hire.149 
Provided a claimant could establish the other elements of the tort,150 an injunction would be an 
appropriate remedy.151 
D The Duty of Care 
The claimant in Rhodes brought proceedings in negligence and under IIED. At first instance, Bean 
J held that there was no duty of care owed because "parental duties of care towards their children only 
arose when they were acting in specific capacities such as occupier, driver or supervisor of small 
children".152 On appeal, the Court held the foreseeability and proximity elements of the duty applied, 
but that it would not be "fair, just and reasonable" to impose a blanket duty of care upon the parental 
role.153 
Whether or not the conclusions on negligence are correct, there is no equivalent duty under the 
IIED tort. If it were to be subsumed into negligence, there would be difficulties for claimants who 
would have to prove a duty existed. There will be scenarios, like Rhodes, where a duty cannot be 
established. Furthermore, the duty of care is more relevant to cases where the defendant's conduct is 
inadvertent, rather than intentional. Its purpose is to restrict potential claimants from bringing actions 
against persons who, for proximity and policy reasons, cannot be said to owe a duty to not act 
negligently. 
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E Recoverable Harm 
The law of negligence does not allow recovery for severe distress falling short of a recognisable 
psychiatric illness.154 This should not be the rule for IIED.155 If the tort were subsumed into 
negligence, claimants will be denied compensation.  
VII PRIVACY AND IIED  
New Zealand courts recognise two torts of privacy: publication of private information, the tort in 
Hosking v Runting;156 and intrusion into seclusion, the tort in C v Holland.157 The privacy field is 
developing rapidly in New Zealand, but is still an uncertain area of tort law.158 The common law of 
invasion of privacy in New Zealand has its roots in Wilkinson,159 and features many conceptual 
similarities. The article analyses the relationship between, and the impact of, the evolving privacy 
torts on IIED. It then argues that IIED has a legitimate role overlapping with, but independent from, 
these torts. Hosking and Holland are not suited to subsume the Wilkinson action, especially given the 
narrower purpose of privacy torts and their limitations. 
A The Relationship Between Privacy and Wilkinson 
1 Mutually protected interests 
One might initially question whether there is any relevant relationship between IIED and the 
privacy torts, because the facts in Wilkinson do not neatly fit under either Hosking or Holland. 
However, the primary interface between the two fields lies in their mutual protection of certain socio-
legal interests. Both protect the individual from intrusive and invasive conduct jeopardising legal 
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rights to personal safety,160 dignity,161 autonomy,162 and mental well-being.163 So, there is room for 
the argument that privacy, in its current and developing form, might render IIED unnecessary, 
especially on the intrusion tort front. Indeed, given that situations like Rhodes might be covered by 
the Hosking or Holland torts, some academics have questioned the continued usefulness of IIED, 
implying that it is being subsumed.164 However, it is wrong to suggest that, simply because one tort 
protects certain interests or rights, another tort is useless or should be relegated to the common law 
graveyard. Tort is a complex matrix of causes of action, which often overlap and cover a spectrum of 
interests. Furthermore, the privacy torts cover a narrower area of tort law, so sounding the death knell 
for Wilkinson with privacy as its executioner would likely leave deserving claimants uncompensated. 
This issue is discussed below.  
2 Injunctive relief and truthfulness 
Another reason for the overlap between the two fields is because IIED, in New Zealand at least, 
may be considered the "parent" tort of the torts of privacy. For example, Tucker I165 was primarily a 
privacy case of intentional disclosure of private information which might have caused emotional 
distress, rather than an IIED case arising from an intention to cause mental suffering. Nevertheless, 
the Court issued an interim injunction relying on Wilkinson. Jeffries J noted a tort of privacy was a 
"natural progression of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and in accordance with 
the renowned ability of the common law to provide a remedy for a wrong".166 Currently, therefore, 
IIED and privacy are both able to provide injunctive relief for breach of these interests.167 
Furthermore, if it is accepted that IIED is actionable in cases where the information is true, but 
sufficiently threatening or abusive, then disclosure of truthful information causing severe distress is 
  
160  See Wilkinson, above n 1, at 59; and Hosking, above n 156, at [22] per Gault P and Blanchard J and at [260] 
per Tipping J. 
161  See Rhodes, above n 4, at [92] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Wilson; and Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 30, 
[2007] 3 NZLR 91 at [123] as cited in Holland, above n 157, at [27]. See also Nicole Moreham "Why is 
Privacy Important? Privacy, Dignity and Development of the New Zealand Breach of Privacy Tort" in Jeremy 
Finn and Stephen Todd (eds) Law, Liberty, Legislation (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008) 231 at 236. 
162  See Hosking, above n 156, at [22] per Gault P and Blanchard J and at [239] per Tipping J; and Holland, above 
n 157, at [65]. See also Thomas Levy McKenzie "The New Intrusion Tort: The News Media Exposed?" (2014) 
45 VUWLR 79 at 80–82. 
163  See Hosking, above n 156, at [239] per Tipping J. See also McKenzie, above n 162, at 82; and Peter Handford 
"Wilkinson v Downton: Pathways to the future?" (2012) 20 Tort L Rev 145 at 148. 
164  Todd, above n 158, at 736–738. 
165  Tucker I, above n 49.  
166  At 6.  
167  See for example Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63, (2001) 
208 CLR 199 at [256] per Gummow and Hayne JJ.  
 WILKINSON V DOWNTON AFTER RHODES AND ITS FUTURE VIABILITY IN NEW ZEALAND 129 
another similarity between the two fields. Had Rhodes written about OPO's Asperger's syndrome, 
dyspraxia or dysgraphia in an abusive way and intended to cause severe distress, OPO might have had 
more chance of success in gaining an injunction under either the second joint reasons in Rhodes or 
Hosking. 
B The Case for IIED's Independence 
There are conceptual and policy-based difficulties with both of the torts of privacy subsuming 
IIED. Can a parent tort be subsumed by its child? Should we allow privacy to do IIED's work even if 
claimants go uncompensated? This part of the article analyses these issues, concluding that 
subsumption or abolition of IIED by the common law of privacy is undesirable.  
1 The "highly offensive" hurdle 
In Rhodes, the proceeding under the English privacy tort of misuse of private information was 
struck out at first instance because the information not about OPO.168 This conclusion was upheld on 
appeal.169 Had the opposite been the case, an action under this tort might have gone to trial, so there 
is an area of overlap between the two fields. If the proceedings were brought in New Zealand and if 
the information was about OPO, the claimant would need to prove that the publication would be 
"highly offensive to a reasonable person".170 This is a formidable hurdle, one, it is submitted, that is 
too high for the ordinary IIED claimant to clear where, otherwise, a remedy might be expected.  
For example, if a bitter ex-husband were to reveal that his ex-wife had a particularly embarrassing 
health condition at her second wedding, intending severe distress, it is unlikely she would recover 
under Hosking. It is probably embarrassing, humiliating and potentially severely emotionally 
distressing, but can it really be said to be highly offensive to the reasonable person? Probably not. 
Alternatively, if the ex-husband were to film the ex-wife kissing her new husband in the backyard of 
their home, the Holland tort would again require that this intrusion be highly offensive to the 
reasonable person,171 something the ex-wife would likely have difficulty in proving.  
Conversely, an IIED tort requiring at least severe distress would have a reasonable prospect of 
success, especially if intention to cause distress need not be the defendant's sole purpose.172 
Presumably, the Rhodes filter – that the conduct be deceptive, threatening or abusive – is also easier 
to satisfy than a "highly offensive" requirement. Therefore, deserving claimants who would otherwise 
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be able to maintain a successful action could be left without a remedy if the Hosking or Holland torts 
subsumed IIED. 
2 Damage 
A major difference between IIED and the privacy torts is that the latter group are actionable per 
se, whereas the former tort requires proof of damage. The Hosking and Holland torts protect against, 
inter alia, harms "in the nature of humiliation and distress" and are "not concerned with issues of 
whether there need be recognised psychiatric harm".173 In this respect, they are partially consistent 
with Rhodes in that distressing consequences are compensatable, provided they materialise into a 
recognisable psychiatric illness,174 or, as per the second joint reasons, severe distress.175 While "the 
question remains whether [IIED] … might cover intrusive conduct causing mental upset",176 thereby 
offering a concurrent claim with the Holland tort if the differing elements are satisfied, it is submitted 
that leaving the privacy torts to do IIED's work on their own is undesirable.  
IIED should not be, and never has been, actionable per se. The essence of Wilkinson is that some 
damage is sustained;177 this article argues the appropriate threshold for mental suffering should be 
severe distress. The reason for the damage requirement is that claimants should not be entitled to 
compensation for the mere vicissitudes of life—harmless practical jokes or heated arguments—that 
every person is subject to.178 So while it is acknowledged that protection of intangible interests such 
as dignity or freedom from intrusion is a part of the Wilkinson action, damage is a core requirement. 
It would, therefore, be conceptually illegitimate and undesirable from a policy perspective to abolish 
IIED in light of the developments in Hosking and Holland.  
Finally, IIED's mental element could provide a point of difference in terms of damages 
recoverable. The Rhodes formulation distinguishes itself from Hosking on the basis the conduct must 
be intended to cause severe distress, whereas liability under the publicity tort need not stem from an 
intention to cause harm. So, while severe distress may be compensatable under either IIED (as 
proposed) or Hosking, there might be a difference in assessing the quantum of damages where such 
consequences were intended (IIED) compared to cases that do not feature this intention but result in 
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the same consequence (Hosking). Wilkinson's touchstone has always been unjustified infringement 
with personal safety that causes damage,179 rather than just a dignitary tort akin to Hosking or 
Holland. Indeed, Todd has argued that the Wilkinson line of authority probably has "little or no part 
to play in developing a new rule of liability in respect of intrusive conduct", citing conceptual 
difficulties with merging the two fields of tort law and identifying the Rhodes hurdles as difficult to 
surmount.180 
VIII CONCLUSION 
Rhodes is a welcome improvement to the law of IIED, and the rule in Wilkinson has been 
effectively reincarnated into a newly defined tort. However, it does not go far enough to secure IIED's 
future as a stand-alone cause of action, especially given the ever-expanding tort of negligence. The 
conduct element requires clarification; the consequence element requires reform to allow recovery for 
severe distress. It is no longer tenable, doctrinally or policy-wise, to require claimants to suffer 
physical injury or a recognisable psychiatric illness. If New Zealand tort law is to provide fair 
compensation to deserving claimants in the IIED context, an appellate court will need to overrule 
current authority and depart from the first joint reasons in Rhodes. While it is no easy task for the 
common law to make a significant leap forward, the social milieu is markedly different from 1897, 
and the legal and policy reasons highlighted in the article justify further reform.  
 
 
  
  
179  Wilkinson, above n 1, at 59.  
180  Todd, above n 158, at 738.  
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